

7. Kirkpatrick, Schuyler, Coyne Report (April 1962) : A study of the organization and activities of the CIA and its relationship with other agencies in the intelligence community.

8. Katzenbach Report (March 1967) : A review of the relationships between government agencies and educational and voluntary organizations which operate abroad.

9. Lindsay Report on Covert Operations of the U.S. Government (December 1966) : A study of supervision by Congress and within the CIA of covert operations.

10. OMB Report (Schlesinger Study of the Intelligence Community) (March 1971) : A study of the organization of the intelligence community and its cost-effectiveness.

Most recommendations have focused on the organization of the intelligence community and were preludes to a reorganization. The Katzenbach Report ended CIA funding of educational and voluntary organizations. The issue of CIA activities within the United States was not given major attention by any other of these review panels.

Conclusions

Some improvement in the congressional oversight system would be helpful. The problem of providing adequate oversight and control while maintaining essential security is not easily resolved. Several knowledgeable witnesses pointed to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as an appropriate model for congressional oversight of the Agency. That Committee has had an excellent record of providing effective oversight while avoiding security leaks in a highly sensitive area.

One of the underlying causes of the problems confronting the CIA arises out of the pervading atmosphere of secrecy in which its activities have been conducted in the past. One aspect of this has been the secrecy of the budget.

A new body is needed to provide oversight of CIA within the Executive Branch. Because of the need to preserve security, the CIA is not subject to the usual constraints of audit, judicial review, unlimited publicity, or open congressional budget review and oversight. Consequently, its operations require additional external control. The authority assigned the job of supervising the CIA must be given sufficient power and significance to assure the public of effective supervision.

The situation whereby the Agency determined whether its own employees would be prosecuted must not be permitted to recur.

Recommendation (3)

The President should recommend to Congress the establishment of a Joint Committee on Intelligence to assume the oversight role currently played by the Armed Services Committees.^a

Recommendation (4)

Congress should give careful consideration to the question whether the budget of the CIA should not, at least to some extent, be made public, particularly in view of the provisions of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution.^a

Recommendation (5)

a. The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board should be expanded to include oversight of the CIA. This expanded oversight board should be composed of distinguished citizens with varying backgrounds and experience. It should be headed by a full-time chairman and should have a full-time staff appropriate to its role. Its functions related to the CIA should include:

1. Assessing compliance by the CIA with its statutory authority.
2. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence collection.
3. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence estimates.
4. Assessing the quality of the organization of the CIA.
5. Assessing the quality of the management of the CIA.
6. Making recommendations with respect to the above subjects to the President and the Director of Central Intelligence, and, where appropriate, the Attorney General.

^a Commissioner Griswold adds the following statement:

"The assignment given to the Commission relates only to the domestic activities of the CIA. But the problems which have arisen in the domestic field cannot be fully understood and evaluated unless they are viewed against the role which the CIA has undertaken to play outside the United States. Because of the secret nature of its operations, legal and moral limitations may not always be kept in mind. In this situation, it should not be surprising that personnel, when working in the United States, should not always feel that they are subject to ordinary restraints.

"Congress should, in my opinion, decide by law whether and to what extent the CIA should be an action organization, carrying out operations as distinguished from the gathering and evaluation of intelligence. If action operations were limited, there would be a lessened need for secrecy, and the adverse effect which the activities of the CIA sometimes have on the credibility of the United States would be modified.

"One of the great strengths of this country is a deep and wide-fung capacity for goodwill. Those who represent us, both at home and abroad, should recognize the potentiality of that goodwill and take extreme care not to undermine it, lest their efforts be in fact counter-productive to the long-range security interests of the United States."

"No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time."